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BRIBERY, GRAFT, AND CONFLICTS OF
INTEREST: THE SCOPE OF "PUBLIC
OFFICIAL"
Dixson v. United States, 104 S. Ct. 1172 (1984)
I. INTRODUCTION
In Dixson v. United States,1 the Supreme Court held that an em-
ployee of a private firm, hired by a municipal government to admin-
ister the municipality's federal block grant funds, was a public
official under Tite 18 of the United States Code § 201(a).2 Section
201 imposes federal criminal liability on anyone who bribes or at-
tempts to bribe a public official, and on any public official who solic-
its, accepts, or agrees to take a bribe.3 Section 201(a) helps
establish the scope of federal jurisdiction as it applies to official
bribery by defining a "public official" as a
Member of Congress, or Resident Commissioner, either before or af-
ter he has qualified, or an officer or employee or person acting for or
on behalf of the United States, or any department, agency or branch of
Government thereof, including the District of Columbia, in any official
function, under or by authority of any such department, agency, or
branch of Government, or a juror. .... 4
In arriving at its conclusion in Dixson, the Court firmly estab-
lished that the degree of public trust and official federal responsibil-
ity inherent in an alleged official's position determines whether that
individual is properly classified as a "public official" under
§ 201(a). 5 The proper construction of "public official" does not
simply consider the formal legal relationship between the individual
and the federal government.6 The Court's reasoning indicates that
all individuals who occupy the same legal relationship to the federal
government will not necessarily be similarly classified under
§ 201 (a). Therefore, the truly significant precedent that stems from
1 104 S. Ct. 1172 (1984).
2 18 U.S.C. § 201(a) (1962).
3 18 U.S.C. § 201 (1962).
4 18 U.S.C. § 201(a) (1962).




the decision is the Court's focus on public trust and official
responsibility.
This Note analyzes two approaches to construing "public offi-
cial" under § 201(a) and argues that the approach adopted by the
Court in Dixson is the approach that Congress intended courts to
adopt when construing § 201(a). The Note scrutinizes the Court's
application of this approach to determine the proper scope of the
holding as it relates to other privately employed individuals whose
work involves federally funded programs.
II. FACTS
On July 8, 1982, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals upheld a
jury's finding in the Central District of Illinois7 that both Arthur
Dixson andJames Lee Hinton had violated §§ 201(c)(1)-(2) of Title
18 of the United States Code.8 In reaching its decision, the Seventh
Circuit held that Hinton and Dixson were public officials under
§ 201(a) even though they had no contractual relationship with the
federal government. 9 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to re-
solve the issue of whether the petitioners, Dixson and Hinton, were
"public officials" for purposes of § 201(a).10
Pursuant to the Housing and Community Development Act of
1974 (HCDA),11 the City of Peoria, Illinois had obtained two federal
block grants from the Department of Housing and Urban Develop-
7 United States v. Hinton, 683 F.2d 195 (7th Cir. 1982), aff'd sub nom. Dixson v.
United States, 104 S. Ct. 1172 (1984).
8 The statute violated by Hinton and Dixson provides that,
(c) Whoever, being a public official or person selected to be a public official,
directly or indirectly, corruptly asks, demands, exacts, solicits, seeks, accepts, re-
ceives, or agrees to receive anything of value for himself or for any other person or
entity, in return for:
(1) being influenced in his performance of any official act; or
(2) being influenced to commit or aid in committing, or to collude in, or allow
any fraud, to make opportunity for the commission of any fraud, on the United
States...
(e) Shall be fined not more than $20,000 or three times the monetary
equivalent of the thing of value whichever is greater, or imprisoned for not more
than fifteen years, or both, and may be disqualified from holding any office of
honor, trust or profit under the United States.
18 U.S.C. § 201(c)(l)-(2), (e) (1962).
9 683 F.2d at 199-200.
10 Dixson v. United States, 103 S. Ct. 567 (1982).
11 42 U.S.C. §§ 5301-20 (1983 & Supp. 1984). The HCDA authorized the Secretary
of Housing and Urban Development to make grants not in excess of $3,650,000,000 for
the fiscal year 1979 to establish and maintain viable urban communities. 42 U.S.C.
§ 5303 (Supp. III 1979) (amended by Pub. L. No. 96-399 (1980) and Pub. L. No. 97-35
(1981) so as to increase appropriations in subsequent years).
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ment (HUD).12 Rather than administer these federal grant funds it-
self, the City of Peoria contracted with United Neighborhoods Inc.
(UNI), a private community-based corporation, for UNI to dis-
tribute the funds.' 3 UNI served as a subgrantee of Peoria's HCDA
funds. UNI, in turn, employed both Dixson and Hinton to adminis-
ter the contract between UNI and Peoria. 14 Although the Housing
Committee of UNI retained formal responsibility for awarding hous-
ing rehabilitation contracts, testimony at trial revealed that this pro-
cedure frequently had been bypassed. 15 In reality, Dixson and
Hinton, as officers of UNI, administered these grant funds. 16
Hinton and Dixson extracted kickbacks from two contractors,
Ora Logsdon and Gerald Lilly, for ten percent of each rehabilitation
contract that UNI awarded to the contractors. 17 On at least one oc-
casion, Dixson and Hinton instructed Lilly to bid on certain houses
and suggested that Lilly lower one bid.' When Logsdon and Lilly
received their first draw checks from UNI for twenty percent of the
contract price, they turned over one-half of the cash proceeds to
Hinton and Dixson.' 9 Despite the apparent impropriety of their
conduct, the petitioners claimed that they were not "public officials"
under § 201 (a) and, therefore, were not subject to federal prosecu-
tion.20 Petitioners argued that they did not work "for or on behalf
of the United States" because they did not have any formal bond
12 Dixson, 104 S. Ct. at 1174. One grant, for $636,000, was a Metro Reallocation
Grant, and the other, for $400,000, was a Community Development Block Grant. Id.
13 Id. UNI and the City of Peoria actually entered into five separate agreements. The
first four agreements provided UNI with $492,500 and allocated $31,500 for the peti-
tioners' salaries. Only the fifth agreement for $669,200 made any initial reference to
federal legislation. UNI and the City of Peoria, however, later amended the first four
agreements and included explicit references to Community Development Block Grants
Regulations. Id. at 1176 n.5.
HUD regulations explicitly allow a local government to subcontract the administra-
tion of grant funds in this manner. Three types of subrecipients are eligible: neighbor-
hood-based non-profit organizations, such as UNI; small business investment
companies; and local development corporations. 24 C.F.R. § 570.204 (1984). See also
42 U.S.C. § 5302(a)(1), (c) (1982).
14 Dixson, 104 S. Ct. at 1174. Dixson served as Executive Director of UNI and Hinton
served as Housing Rehabilitation Coordinator of UNI. Id.
15 Id. at 1176. Although formal responsibility for awarding contracts rested with the
Housing Committee, the Committee had approved only one out of the ten contracts
awarded by UNI to the one contractor that testified at trial. Id. at n.7.
16 Id. at 1174. As part of his responsibility for the general supervision of UNI pro-
grams, Dixson controlled fiscal operations and executed contracts. Hinton contracted
with both rehabilitation assistance applicants and demolition firms. Id.
17 Hinton, 683 F.2d at 197. The kickbacks totaled $42,604. Dixson, 104 S. Ct. at 1174.
18 Hinton, 683 F.2d at 197.
19 Dixson, 104 S. Ct. at 1174.
20 Id. at 1175. Illinois conceivably could have prosecuted the petitioners for violation
of an Illinois bribery statute. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 3301 (1977).
SUPREME COURT REVIEW
with the United States, such as an agency relationship, an employ-
ment contract, or any other direct contractual obligation. 21 Peti-
tioners emphasized that neither they nor UNI had ever entered into
an agreement with the United States or with HUD.22 The govern-
ment argued conversely that § 201(a) clearly extended to persons
"administering federally sponsored activities . . . whether or not
those persons have some employment relationship with the United
States."
23
III. THE SUPREME COURT'S DECISION
A. THE MAJORITY
Justice Marshall, writing for the majority in Dixson, held that the
petitioners had acted for or on behalf of HUD in administering
block grants, and that they were "public officials" under § 201(a).
24
The majority, therefore, rejected the petitioners' claim that an indi-
vidual must hold a direct relationship to the federal government for
that individual to be considered a "public official." 25 Although the
majority recognized that the specific wording of § 201 (a) did not re-
solve the issue, it noted that the legislative history of § 201(a)
showed that Congress intended to include individuals like Hinton
and Dixson under this Act.2 6 The Court found no ambiguity re-
garding congressional intent and, as a result, did not apply the "rule
of lenity," which would have required a narrow construction of
"public official." 27
Justice Marshall analyzed the legislative history of § 201, and
recognized that Congress had drafted earlier bribery statutes in
broad jurisdictional terms and had amended these terms when they
appeared incapable of encompassing individuals employed by new
types of government institutions such as government-owned corpo-
21 Dixson, 104 S. Ct. at 1177.
22 Id.
23 Brief for the Respondent at 10, Dixson v. United States, 104 S. Ct. 1172 (1984).
24 Dixson, 104 S. Ct. at 1180.
25 Id.
26 Id. at 1182.
27 Id. at 1182 n.19. The Court previously had held that "ambiguity concerning the
ambit of criminal statutes should be resolved in favor of lenity." Rewis v. United States,
401 U.S. 808, 812 (1971). In addition to assuring that citizens have adequate notice of
potential criminal liability for contemplated acts, the "rule of lenity" set out by the
Court in Rewis relates directly to the nation's system of federalism. Because criminal
wrongdoing traditionally is punishable under state law, expansive interpretations of fed-
eral criminal statutes might "alter sensitive federal-state relationships." Id. See also
United States v. Del Toro, 513 F.2d 656, 662 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 826 (1975)
("a healthy regard for the federal system of divided powers . . . compels a close scru-
tiny" of congressional intent in drafting § 201(a)).
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rations. 28 Moreover, the Court found it significant that Congress,
while drafting § 201(a), knew that the judiciary tended to apply
broadly the phrase "acting for or on behalf of the United States"
when the judiciary interpreted earlier bribery statutes.29 Justice
Marshall reasoned that if Congress intended to limit "public offi-
cials" to individuals holding a direct relationship with the federal
government, Congress would not have adopted language that it
knew was subject to broad interpretation.
30
Furthermore, the majority considered Congress' rejection of al-
ternative language as proof that Congress did not intend to restrict
the definition of "public official" to individuals who directly con-
tracted with the government.3 ' The Court reasoned that this re-
jected language already would have covered direct contractors as
agents of the United States.3 2 Thus, according to the majority, Con-
gress would have had no reason to adopt the broader "acting for"
language if it intended to include only direct contractors as "public
officials."3 3 Congress would not have adopted more expansive lan-
28 Dixson, 104 S. Ct. at 1178. Congress, in 1853, passed the first federal bribery stat-
ute, which sought to prohibit the bribing of "any officer of the United States, or person
holding any place of trust or profit, or discharging any official function under. . . any
department of. . .the United States." An Act to Prevent Frauds on the Treasury, ch.
81, § 6, 10 Stat. 170, 171 (1853). In 1921, the Supreme Court held that an inspector
employed by a wholly government-owned corporation was not an agent of the United
States because a government corporation was a separate entity from the United States.
United States v. Strang, 254 U.S. 491, 493 (1921). In response to Strang, Congress
amended the federal bribery statute, broadened its scope, and guaranteed that the act
covered" 'all persons acting for the United States Government in an official function.' "
104 S. Ct. at 1178 n.9 (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 304, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. A14, A15
(1947)).
29 Dixson, 104 S. Ct. at 1178. Justice Marshall noted that courts frequently applied
the federal bribery statute to employees of government agencies prior to explicit con-
gressional approval of this application. Id. at n.10 (citing United States v. Birdsall, 233
U.S. 223 (1914); United States v. Levine, 129 F.2d 745 (2d Cir. 1942)).
30 Dixson, 104 S. Ct. at 1179.
31 Id. Congress rejected language in earlier bills that defined a "public official"
under § 201(a) as a "Member of or Delegate to Congress, or Resident Commissioner,
either before or after he has qualified, an officer, agent, or employee of the United
States, in the executive, legislative, or judicial branch of the government, or of any
agency, orjuror." See H.R. 3411, 87th Cong., Ist Sess. § 201(a) (1961); H.R. 2156, 86th
Cong., 1st Sess. § 201(a) (1959); H.R. 12547, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. § 201(a) (1958).
32 Dixson, 104 S. Ct. at 1179.
33 Id. Congress adopted the broader "acting for" language as a result of Department
ofJustice testimony that under certain circumstances, a court might not consider a per-
son who acted on behalf of the Government to be "an officer, agent, or employee of the
United States." The Department of Justice testified that such an individual should,
nonetheless, be punished for accepting bribes. See Federal Conflict of Interest Legislation:
Hearings on H.R. 302, H.R. 3411, H.R. 3412, H.R. 3050 and H.R. 7139 Before the Antitrust
Subcomm. of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 36 (1961).
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guage if it did not intend to expand "public official" beyond direct
contractors.
Justice Marshall also found that congressional committee re-
ports indicated that Congress had intended that § 201(a) apply to
individuals like Hinton and Dixson even though they had no direct
contractual ties to the federal government.34 Committee reports
from both the House and Senate stated that the proposed legisla-
tion at issue in Dixson was not intended to restrict the broad inter-
pretation of bribery statutes. 35 The Court found that these reports
supported the holding because "[flederal courts interpreting federal
bribery laws . . . generally avoided formal distinctions, such as the
requirement of a direct contractual bond, that would artificially nar-
row the scope of federal criminal jurisdiction. ' 3 6
Justice Marshall found it particularly relevant that the House
Judiciary Committee had cited United States v. Levine37 as an example
of proper judicial construction of federal bribery laws. 38 In Levine,
the Second Circuit held that an employee of the Market Administra-
tor for the New York Metropolitan Milk Marketing Area39 was a
public official even though the United States neither employed nor
paid the employee directly. 40 The Second Circuit reasoned that be-
cause the individual held a responsible position authorized by the
United States, he acted on behalf of the United States for purposes
of § 201(a). 41 The majority in Dixson stated that the Judiciary Com-
mittee's support for the construction in Levine indicated that an indi-
vidual need not have a direct contractual bond to the government
when acting on behalf of the government.42
Justice Marshall stated that in addition to Levine, the majority of
recent decisions in federal district courts and courts of appeals sup-
ported the holding that a "public official" need not have a formal
contractual or agency bond to the federal government to be consid-
ered a "public official."' 43 The Court emphasized that the majority
34 Dixson, 104 S. Ct. at 1179.
35 See S. Rep. No. 2213, 87th Cong. 2d Sess. 4, reprinted in 1962 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws 3852, 3853; H.R. Rep. No. 748, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 17 (1961).
36 Dixson, 104 S. Ct. at 1179.
37 129 F.2d 745 (2d Cir. 1942).
38 Dixson, 104 S. Ct. at 1179.
39 See 7 C.F.R. § 1002.3 (1984). Pursuant to authority granted under the Agricultural
Marketing Agreement Act of 1937, the Secretary of Agriculture created "metropolitan
milk marketing areas" and appointed "market administrators" to carry out orders of the
Department of Agriculture. See also 7 U.S.C. § 608(c)(3)-(4) (1983).
40 Levine, 129 F.2d at 747.
41 Id.
42 Dixson, 104 S. Ct. at 1180.
43 Id. at 1181.
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of lower courts had found individuals to be "public officials," re-
gardless of whether or not the individuals were privately employed,
if the individuals held positions of official responsibility. 44 In addi-
tion, Justice Marshall stated that the majority opinion was "fully
consistent" with Krichman v. United States,45 in which the Court held
that a baggage porter employed by a federally controlled railroad
had not acted for or on behalf of the federal government in an offi-
cial function.46 The baggage porter, according to the Court's rea-
soning in Dixson, lacked any duties of an official character; in
contrast, Dixson and Hinton did hold positions of national public
trust.
47
Thus, in summarizing its analysis of the legislative history of
§ 201(a), the Court concluded that whether an individual was a
"public official" depended on "whether the person occupie[d] a po-
sition of public trust with official federal responsibilities" and not on
whether the individual served as an employee, agent, or contractor
of the government. 48 Because Hinton and Dixson had operational
responsibility for the administration of HCDA funds and were re-
quired to abide by federal guidelines, the majority concluded that
they served as "public officials" for purposes of § 201(a).49 The
Court, however, emphasized that federal funding did not necessarily
subject a local organization or its employees to federal jurisdic-
tion.50 Justice Marshall indicated that some employees of block
grant recipients, as well as some contractors for grant recipients,
would not properly be classified as "public officials" because they
did not "assume some duties of an official nature."'5 The degree of
"official responsibility for carrying out a federal program or policy"
44 Id. at 1181-82 (discussing United States v. Hollingshead, 672 F.2d 751 (9th Cir.
1982) (an employee of a private banking institution was a public official under § 201 (a)
because he administered an expenditure of federal funds that placed him in a position of
responsibility); United States v. Kirby, 587 F.2d 876 (7th Cir. 1978) (two privately em-
ployed grain inspectors were public officials under § 201(a) because they implemented a
warehouse licensing program established by Congress that placed them in a position of
responsibility); United States v. Gallegos, 510 F. Supp. 1112 (D.N.M. 1981) (state em-
ployee was a "public official" under § 201(a) because he processed federal Farmers
Home Administration grant applications and, therefore, was in a position of
responsibility)).
45 256 U.S. 363 (1921).
46 Dixson, 104 S. Ct. at 1182 (citing Krichman, 256 U.S. 363).
47 id.
48 Id. at 1180.
49 Id.








Justice Marshall's opinion, however, failed to obtain the unani-
mous support of the Court. Justice O'Connor, writing for the dis-
sent, found that the government's evidence was "too weak" to
resolve the ambiguity as to which individuals Congress intended to
define as "public officials." 53 The dissenting Justices relied on the
"rule of lenity" and stated that they could not consider Dixson and
Hinton to have acted clearly "for or on behalf of the Federal Gov-
ernment." 54 Although Justice O'Connor recognized that the pur-
pose of the federal bribery statute is to proscribe bribery of
individuals who execute a federal trust, she also stated that "[t]o say
that the statute is broadly aimed at all persons bearing a federal
trust . .. is not to resolve the ambiguity over what constitutes a
federal trust.'
55
The dissent analyzed the legislative history of § 201, and
agreed with the majority that House Judiciary Committee support
for the Second Circuit's construction of § 201(a) in Levine demon-
strated congressional intent to include within the provisions of the
statute individuals who do not possess direct contractual agree-
ments with the government. 56 Justice O'Connor, however, pointed
out that congressional intent to include more than direct contrac-
tors under the statute did not indicate exactly who Congress in-
tended to include.57 Moreover, the dissent found Levine, the Milk
Marketing Area employee, distinct from Dixson and Hinton because
an agent of the government employed Levine, while UNI, which em-
ployed Dixson and Hinton, did not clearly have any agency ties to
the federal government. 58 The dissent, therefore, concluded that
52 Id.
53 Id. at 1183 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justices Brennan, Rehnquist, and Stevens
joined in the dissent.
54 Id. at 1185 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor stated that the Court's
holding required "some affirmative reason to believe that Congress thought that em-
ployees of federal grant recipients or their subgrantees are acting for or on behalf of the
Federal Government even when the grant recipient is a state or local government." Id.
55 Id. at 1183 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
56 Id. at 1184 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). See also supra notes 37-42 and accompany-
ing text.
57 104 S. Ct. at 1184 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor explained that
"saying that the class covered by the statute includes more than direct contractors does
not begin to define the class actually covered." Id.
58 Id. The dissent stated that a grantee does not necessarily have an agency relation-
ship with the government. Because a subgrantee, such as UNI, would be one step fur-
ther removed from the government than a grantee, it appears even less clear to the
dissent that a subgrantee would have an agency relationship with the government. Id.
[Vol. 75882
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congressional approval of the construction applied by the Levine
court offered no support for the majority position in Dixson.59
The dissent also stated that retention of the broad "acting for
or on behalf" language did not necessarily indicate who Congress
intended to include within that class.60 Justice O'Connor claimed
that nothing in the legislative history of the bribery statute indicated
that Congress had in mind individuals like Hinton and Dixson when
it retained this wording.61 Justice O'Connor stated that "[t]he most
that can be said of Congress's reenactment of the 'acting for' lan-
guage following the proposal and criticism of alternative bills is that
Congress perceived some difference between the enacted and
unenacted language and that the pre-1962 language should be re-
tained out of caution."
62
Furthermore, the dissent claimed that the earlier cases cited by
the majority also did not support the majority construction of "pub-
lic official." 63 Justice O'Connor stated that no other Supreme Court
decision could support the majority position because the Court
never had held an individual to be a "public official" under the lan-
guage of § 201(a).64 According to the dissent, the lower court deci-
sions that involved grant recipients, on which the majority relied,
interpreted the statute's language in an inconsistent fashion. 65 Jus-
tice O'Connor stated that cases relied on by the majority that did
not involve grant recipients also did not support the majority's con-
struction because "the person bribed had a more or less direct
agency relationship with the Federal Government."
66




62 Id. at 1184-85 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
63 Id. at 1185 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
64 The dissent claimed that Krichman v. United States, 256 U.S. 363 (1921), did not
support the majority's decision because the baggage carrier in Krichman did not act as a
"public official." 104 S. Ct. at 1185 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). See supra note 45 and
accompanying text.
65 Dixson, 104 S. Ct. at 1185 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (comparing United States v.
Loschiavo, 531 F.2d 659 (2d Cir. 1976); United States v. Del Toro, 513 F.2d 656 (2d Cir.
1975); United States v. Hoskins, 520 F. Supp. 410 (N.D. Ill. 1981), with United States v.
Hinton, 683 F.2d 195 (7th Cir. 1982); United States v. Mosley, 659 F.2d 812 (7th Cir.
1981)).
66 Dixson, 104 S. Ct. at 1185 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (discussing United States v.
Hollingshead, 672 F.2d 751 (9th Cir. 1982); United States v. Kirby, 587 F.2d 876 (7th
Cir. 1978); Harlow v. United States, 301 F.2d 361 (5th Cir. 1962); United States v.
Gallegos, 510 F. Supp. 1112 (D.N.M. 1981); United States v. Griffin, 401 F. Supp. 1222




other than the fact that little or no support existed for its conclusion
in the statute's wording, legislative history, or earlier judicial inter-
pretation. 67 First, the dissent recognized that Congress had not
considered whether employees of grant recipients were "public offi-
cials" and that these employees had been rarely prosecuted under
federal jurisdiction. 68 In light of the long history and wide-scale use
of federal grant programs, Justice O'Connor found it significant that
Congress and prosecutors tended not to recognize explicitly em-
ployees of grant recipients as "public officials." 69 The dissent in-
ferred from the lack of expressed recognition that neither Congress
nor federal prosecutors considered employees of grant recipients
"public officials" under § 201(a).70
Second, the dissent stressed that the principle of grantee auton-
omy suggested that courts should not construe employees of grant
recipients as "acting for or on behalf of the government." 7' Justice
O'Connor emphasized that in federal grant programs, the level of
federal involvement is minimized and grantees are given wide dis-
cretion with which to execute the program.72 The level of federal
involvement is especially minimized where the federal funds are dis-
tributed in block grant form to a state or local government.73 Prin-
ciples of federalism "demand a strong presumption that state and
local governments are carrying out their own policies and are acting
on their own behalf, not on behalf of the United States." 74 The dis-
sent concluded that it would be inconsistent with the general rela-
tionship between federal and state governments to consider Hinton
and Dixson "public officials" under § 201(a). 75
Finally, Justice O'Connor stated that the Court should not have
construed the bribery statute unfavorably to Dixson and Hinton
67 Dixson, 104 S. Ct. at 1185 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
68 Id. at 1186 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). The dissent emphasized that not until 1975
did the federal government prosecute an employee of a grant recipient for violating a
federal bribery statute. See Del Toro, 513 F.2d 659 (2d Cir. 1976).
69 104 S. Ct. at 1186 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor explained that
federal grant programs to state and local governments began in the nineteenth century
and, by 1962 when Congress adopted § 201(a), these programs had grown to seven
percent of the federal budget. Id. at 1185-86 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
70 Id. at 1186 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
71 Id. The dissent stated that federal grant programs generally formed a unique type
of government activity whose "main defining characteristic" was the principle of grantee
autonomy. Id.
72 Id.
73 Id. at 1187 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). The dissent explained that in block grant
programs, "federal control over the spending of the distributed funds is minimized and
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when the Court's construction did not reduce the language's ambi-
guity. 76 The dissent refused to support the "public trust" standard
because it left employees of grant recipients with no more insight as
to whether they would be subject to federal prosecution than the
"acting for" language of the statute itself.7 7 Justice O'Connor
stated that the "rule of lenity" entitled individuals to know in ad-
vance what statutes their contemplated actions might violate, re-
gardless of the obvious impropriety of that action.
78
IV. ANALYSIS
A. TWO METHODS OF DEFINING A "PUBLIC OFFICIAL"
The majority and dissenting opinions in Dixson v. United States
reveal two approaches to the classification of a "public official."
The majority's approach focuses on the attributes of the individual's
position; in particular, the "public trust" and "official responsibil-
ity" inherent in the position.7 9 Rather than viewing the issues of
whether the individual is a "public official" and whether the individ-
ual's position involved an "official function" as separate and dis-
tinct, courts adopting this "public trust" approach view the two
issues as interrelated.8 0 Scrutiny of the individual's alleged official
acts reveals the degree of responsibility and public trust inherent in
the position.
The second approach, adopted by the dissent, focuses on the
formal, legal relationship between the individual and the govern-
ment.8 ' Courts adopting this approach define "public official" on
the basis of who employs the alleged official because this indicates
the alleged official's relationship with the government.8 2 For exam-
76 Id. at 1188 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
77 Id. ("[tfhe 'public trust' standard adopted by the Court provides no more guidance
to employees of a grant recipient or its subgrantee than does the statutory language").
78 Id. See also supra note 27 and accompanying text.
79 Dixson, 104 S. Ct. at 1180 ("[t]o determine whether any particular individual falls
within this category, the proper inquiry. . . is whether the person occupies a position of
public trust with official federal responsibilities"). See also United States v. Griffin, 401 F.
Supp. 1222 (S.D. Ind. 1975), aff'd sub nom. United States v. Metro Management Corp.,
541 F.2d 284 (1976) (area management brokers for HUD who solicited kickbacks from
contractors were "public officials" as defined in § 201 (a) because they held positions of
responsibility and exercised discretion on behalf of HUD).
80 See, e.g., United States v. Mosley, 659 F.2d 812, 815 (7th Cir. 1981) ("[tlo review
[defendant's) job specifically further supports the position that he was acting for and on
behalf of the federal Government-).
81 Dixson, 104 S. Ct. at 1184 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). The dissent emphasized the
legal relationship between the defendants and the government and stated, "[i]t is by no
means obvious that such a person is acting for the United States, since a grantee does
not necessarily have an agency relationship with the United States." Id.
82 See, e.g.. United States v. Loschiavo, 531 F.2d 659, 661 (2d Cir. 1976) (the key issue
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ple, in United States v. Del Toro, the defendants bribed an assistant
administrator of a HUD-funded housing project to induce the ad-
ministrator to rent office space from one of the defendants.8 3 The
Second Circuit held that the administrator was not a "public offi-
cial," in part because his superior was a city employee.8 4 As a result,
the Second Circuit held that the administrator was also a city em-
ployee and thus did not act on behalf of the federal government.8 5
In addition, courts adopting the second approach view the indi-
vidual's alleged "official function" as a separate issue from the per-
son's status as a "public official." 8 6 In United States v. Loschiavo, the
defendant bribed an assistant administrator of a HUD-funded hous-
ing project.8 7 The Second Circuit held that the administrator was
not a "public official" under § 201(a) and stated that the character
of an alleged official's employment relationship with the federal
government was of the greatest significance in determining whether
the individual served as a "public official." 88 The court in Loschiavo,
however, stated that whether the individual actually had allocated
federal funds, rather than merely recommending allocations, had no
effect on the character of the employee's relationship to the govern-
ment.8 9 Thus, under the second approach, the relationship de-
pends on the status of the parties and not on the degree of
responsibility or public trust held by the alleged official. 90
B. IDENTIFICATION OF THE APPROACH INTENDED BY CONGRESS
The House Judiciary Committee's analysis of § 201 (a) indicates
that Congress viewed United States v. Levine as the proper construc-
tion of "public official" under § 201(a).91 The Second Circuit in Le-
in the determination of whether an individual is a public official is the nature of the
individual's employment); United States v. Del Toro, 513 F.2d 656, 662 (2d Cir. 1975)
(because individual was a city employee and lacked full responsibility to appropriate
funds, he did not act on behalf of the United States).
83 Del Toro, 513 F.2d at 658.
84 Id. at 662. But see United States v. Gallegos, 510 F. Supp. 1112, 1113 (D.N.M.
1981) (the source of the employee's paycheck is not determinative of whether the em-
ployee is a "public official").
85 Del Toro, 513 F.2d at 662 (the administrator was a city employee carrying out a task
that his superior, another city employee, had delegated to him).
86 See, e.g., Loschiavo, 531 F.2d at 661.
87 Id. at 660. The administrator in Loschiavo was also the administrator in Del Toro.
See supra notes 83-85 and accompanying text.
88 531 F.2d-at 661.
89 Id. But see Mosley, 659 F.2d at 816 (because the defendant, in effect, had authorized
the use of federal funds, he had acted on behalf of the federal government).
90 Dixson, 104 S. Ct. at 1188 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).




vine held that the defendant was a "public official" under § 201(a)
and emphasized that "in view of the responsible nature of his position
with this governmental agency we think it proper to say that he was
a person in an official position acting on behalf of the United
States."'92 Thus, the Second Circuit focused on the responsibility
inherent in Levine's position, the same approach that the majority
adopted in Dixson.93 Congressional support for the construction in
Levine demonstrates that the Dixson majority's focus on "public
trust" was the analysis intended by Congress and, therefore, the ap-
propriate interpretation of § 201 (a).
The dissent in Dixson found that the Levine court's decision did
not help to determine congressional intent, but the Dixson dissent
adopted the wrong approach to the issue of who is a "public offi-
cial" under § 201 (a). Although the Dixson dissent's inquiry focused
on the formal relationship between the alleged official and the fed-
eral government,94 the Levine court's inquiry, the one approved by
Congress, evaluated the degree of responsibility inherent in the al-
leged official's position.95 Thus, the Second Circuit in Levine did not
hold, as the dissent in Dixson claimed, that "the class covered by the
statute [§ 201(a)] includes more than direct contractors." 96 Rather,
it held that individuals who are responsible for the administration of
the federal government's programs are "public officials" under
§ 201(a) despite the absence of any direct contractual relationship
with the government. 9
7
Because the dissent in Dixson ignored the reasoning of the Sec-
ond Circuit in Levine, it distorted the significance of congressional
support for the construction of "public official" in Levine.98 The
Second Circuit reasoned that Levine was a "public official" because
of the responsible nature of his position.99 The House Committee
on the Judiciary's endorsement of the Second Circuit's decision in
Levine, therefore, is significant not only because it demonstrates that
Congress intended noncontractual parties with the government to
92 129 F.2d 745, 747 (2d Cir. 1942) (emphasis supplied).
93 Dixson, 104 S. Ct. at 1180. See supra notes 79-80 and accompanying text. In Levine,
the Second Circuit held that an agent of a state may still act on behalf of the United
States, thereby rejecting the notion of focusing on an alleged official's legal status. 129
F.2d at 748. But see Loschiavo, 531 F.2d at 661; Del Toro, 513 F.2d at 662; supra note 82
and accompanying text.
94 Dixson, 104 S. Ct. at 1184 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); see supra notes 81-85 and
accompanying text.
95 Levine, 129 F.2d at 747.
96 Dixson, 104 S. Ct. at 1184 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
97 Id. at 1180.
98 See supra notes 57-59 and accompanying text.
99 Levine, 129 F.2d at 747.
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be covered under § 201(a), but also because it indicates that Con-
gress intended courts, when applying § 201 (a), to focus on the indi-
vidual's level of responsibility. The dissent in Dixson failed to
recognize this aspect of congressional intent because the dissent fo-
cused on the fact that Levine was employed by an agent of the
United States instead of focusing on the Second Circuit's rationale
that Levine was responsible for the execution of the government's
program.
100
The Dixson majority's approach not only is consistent with
United States v. Levine, but also is consistent with Congress' purpose
in adopting a federal bribery statute. t01 In elaborating the reasons
for federal bribery legislation, the House Committee on the Judici-
ary stated that "criminal laws seek to preserve to the United States
the value of the honest services of its officials and employees by se-
verely punishing their sale."' 1 2 Federal bribery legislation seeks to
protect federal programs from the harm caused by disloyalty on the
part of those responsible for the program's administration.1
0 3
When a court focuses on the degree of responsibility inherent
in an individual's position, it is more likely to discover how a bribe
might undermine a program's execution than when the court fo-
cuses on whether the alleged official is properly classified as an
agent, employee, or grantee of the government. When both a fed-
eral employee and a grantee are responsible for the allocation of
federal funds in a single federal program, a bribe to the grantee is
just as likely to undermine the federal program that they administer
as is a bribe of the federal employee. The alleged official's level of
responsibility, not the individual's legal status, determines the
harmful impact of bribery on a federal program. Congress' intent in
100 Dixson, 104 S. Ct. at 1184 (O'ConnorJ., dissenting).
101 The rule of lenity does not require that a court adopt the narrowest possible con-
struction of a statute. It requires only that a court's construction conform to a statute's
fair meaning and purpose. United States v. Brown, 333 U.S. 18 (1948). In Brown, the
Court stated:
The canon in favor of strict construction is not an inexorable command to
override common sense and evident statutory purpose. . . .Nor does it demand
that a statute be given its 'narrowest meaning'; it is satisfied if the words are given
their fair meaning in accord with the manifest intent of the lawmakers.
Id. at 25-26.
102 H.R. Rep. No. 748, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1961). See also United States v. Griffin,
401 F. Supp. 1222, 1230 (S.D. Ind. 1975)("the purpose of the statute is to protect the
public from the evil consequences of corruption in the public service").
103 See United States v. Gallegos, 510 F. Supp. 1112 (D.N.M. 1981). In Gallegos, the
court held that a state employee who worked in an office of the federal Farmers Home
Administration was a "public official." The court reasoned that improper influence ex-
erted by the official in association with the FHA program harmed the United States, and
that Congress intended such an injury to be punished under federal law. Id. at 1114.
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passing federal bribery legislation, therefore, is best achieved when
courts focus on the degree of public trust and official responsibility
inherent in an individual's position.
Given that the Dixson majority's approach to defining a "public
official" under § 201 (a) is consistent with both Levine and Congress'
general purpose in passing bribery legislation, it is not surprising
that the majority of courts that have faced the "public official" issue
have chosen to focus their inquiries on the degree of the individual's
responsibility rather than the individual's formal relationship with
the government. 10 4 Courts that have focused on the formal rela-
tionship, however, find the Second Circuit's decision in United States
v. Del Toro10 5 of some significance.' 0 6 The court in Del Toro held that
a local administrator of a project financed by HUD was not a public
official under § 201(a).10 7 The Second Circuit emphasized that a
local government had employed both the alleged official and his di-
rect superior. 108 In Del Toro, however, the court also emphasized
that the alleged official lacked responsibility for the appropriation of
funds because his recommendations required approval at five differ-
ent levels before HUD actually would appropriate the funds.10 9
Thus, the Second Circuit in Del Toro focused on both the formal
relationship between the alleged official and the government, and
the degree of responsibility and public trust inherent in the em-
ployee's position. 110 Courts that have relied on Del Toro as prece-
dent for an analysis of the formal relationship between the alleged
official and the government, however, have failed to recognize the
dual focus of Del Toro and, as a result, have rendered misguided
opinions.11' When courts determine whether an individual is acting
104 See Dixson, 104 S. Ct. at 1181.
105 513 F.2d 656 (2d Cir. 1975).
106 See United States v. Loschiavo, 531 F.2d 659, 661 (2d Cir. 1976); United States v.
Hoskins, 520 F. Supp. 410, 413 (N.D. Ill. 1981).
107 Del Toro, 513 F.2d at 662.
108 Id.
109 Id. But see United States v. Hollingshead, 672 F.2d 751, 754 (9th Cir. 1982) (al-
leged official was in a position of responsibility because he had recommended the ex-
penditure of federal funds).
110 Del Toro, 513 F.2d at 662.
111 See, e.g., Loschiavo, 531 F.2d at 661, in which the Second Circuit held that an indi-
vidual was not a public official solely because he was a city employee. A court's focus on
the formal relationship between the alleged official and government, however, can result
in the court's finding that the individual is a "public official" under § 201(a). See, e.g.,
Harlow v. United States, 301 F.2d 361 (5th Cir. 1962). In Harlow, three employees of
the European Exchange System, which operated facilities abroad for the benefit of ser-
vicemen, solicited kickbacks from vendors. The Fifth Circuit held that the employees
were "public officials" because the defendant's employer was "an instrumentality of the
Government." Id. at 371.
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on behalf of the United States, they should adopt the proper ap-
proach and focus on the degree of responsibility and public trust
inherent in the individual's position.
C. APPLICATION OF THE "PUBLIC TRUST" TEST
The Court in Dixson assessed two elements to determine
whether the alleged officers "occupie[d] a position of public trust
with official federal responsibilities": (1) the degree of responsibil-
ity for the administration of the federal program; and (2) the
amount of federal supervision over the individual's work.112 The
majority's assessment of both of these elements is well supported by
the record. Although the formal structure of UNI did not allow
Hinton and Dixson to allocate federal funds without committee ap-
proval, UNI frequently avoided this organizational structure.
113
Also, the evidence revealed that Hinton and Dixson were subject to
financial as well as other types of federal supervision.1 14 The major-
ity in Dixson, therefore, justifiably concluded that Hinton and Dixson
occupied positions of public trust with official federal
responsibilities.
The majority's application of the "public trust" test also reveals
limits to the scope of § 201(a). The Court in Dixson emphasized that
"[buy accepting the responsibility for distributing these federal fiscal
resources, petitioners assumed the quintessentially official role of
administering a social service program established by the United
States Congress." 115 Other grant recipients, although conceivably
subject to bribes, do not assume responsibility for the distribution
(i.e., the administration) of funds. For example, Lilly and Logsdon,
the general contractors from whom Hinton and Dixson solicited
kickbacks, conceivably could have been bribed by subcontractors.
They did not assume responsibility, however, for the distribution of
federal funds; they assumed responsibility only for the use of federal
funds.1 6 When a grant recipient distributes federal funds, the indi-
112 Dixson, 104 S. Ct. at 1180.
113 See supra note 15 and accompanying text. See also United States v. Hollingshead,
672 F.2d 751, 754 (9th Cir. 1982) (an individual holds administrative responsibility
when he recommends expenditures of federal funds); United States v. Griffin, 401 F.
Supp. 1222, 1230 (S.D. Ind. 1975) (defendant placed in position of responsibility be-
cause HUD followed defendant's recommendations 95 percent of the time). But see
United States v. Del Toro, 513 F.2d 656, 662 (2d Cir. 1975) (where an individual's rec-
ommendation requires approval of five other parties, individual is not placed in a posi-
tion of responsibility).
114 See Dixson, 104 S. Ct. at 1175. HCDA subgrantees must abide by equal opportu-
nity, fair labor, environmental, and other requirements. Id.
115 Id. at 1180 (emphasis added).
116 Id. at 1176. Although UNI obligated itself to distribute the grant funds to appli-
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vidual acts on behalf of the government, but when a grant recipient
uses the funds to perform work, the individual merely benefits from
the federal government. A distinction between administrative and
purely operational responsibility is appropriate when a court applies
§ 201(a). Although all grant recipients are "responsible" for the
use of federal funds in accordance with Congress' purpose in mak-
ing the funds available, only those grant recipients with administra-
tive responsibility properly can be said to act for the federal
government and serve as "public officials" under § 201(a).
V. CONCLUSION
In Dixson v. United States, the Supreme Court interpreted the
term "public official" for purposes of § 201(a) of Title 18 of the
United States Code. Justice Marshall properly focused on the de-
gree of public trust and official federal responsibility inherent in the
alleged official's position. The Court resisted an improper construc-
tion of "public official" on the basis of the alleged official's formal,
legal relationship with the federal government. The Supreme Court
in Dixson established a "public trust" test that compels lower courts
to apply § 201(a) in a manner that is consistent with Congress' in-
tent when it passed the provision. Congress intended § 201(a) to
apply to all individuals responsible for the administration of the fed-
eral government's program.
The "public trust" test establishes a method of inquiry for
lower courts. It does not provide a rigid classification that lower
courts can apply uniformly to all private subgrantees under this leg-
islation. Although lower courts would find it easier to apply a rigid
rule that all subgrantees are public officials under § 201(a), such a
rule would be contrary to Congress' intent in enacting the statute.
All subgrantees do not hold the same level of responsibility. Con-
gress intended the statute to apply to all individuals responsible for
the administration of federal projects, not to all recipients of federal
grants. Rather than enacting a uniform classification, the "public
trust" test requires lower courts to assess grant recipients' level of
administrative responsibility on a case-by-case basis. Although the
"public trust" test is less rigid than a uniform classification of sub-
grantees, it is not ambiguous. Adjudication necessarily entails the
cants, a contractor like Lilly or Logsdon could perform all of the work itself and need
not transfer the funds to subsequent parties. Because a contractor has the option of
retaining all grant funds for its own use, it did not assume responsibility for the adminis-
tration of federal funds.
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application of particular facts to an established standard. The "pub-
lic trust" test establishes such a standard.
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